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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002402

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STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, INL/CIVPOL,  
S/CT, NSC FOR HARRIMAN, OSD FOR SHIVERS, CENTCOM FOR  
CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016

TAGS: [MASS](#) [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [AF](#)

SUBJECT: AFGHAN CIVIL ORDER POLICE UNDERMINED BY POOR MOI  
LEADERSHIP

REF: A) KABUL 435 B) KABUL 1727

Classified By: ACTING DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION CAROL RODLEY FOR REASONS  
1.4 (B) AND (D)

¶1. (SBU) The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) are being trained by the Ministry of Interior (MOI) in close coordination with Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to provide a force capable of responding to urban unrest, civil disorder and national emergencies, while also providing a mobile police presence in high-threat remote areas. Currently, the program suffers from a lack of MOI command involvement over critical training, personnel and pay issues. CSTC-A is working closely with the MOI to resolve these problems but their efforts will be unsuccessful unless MOI leadership demonstrates a stronger commitment to this program.

SPECIALIZATION TRAINING IN KABUL AND KANDAHAR: MOVING FORWARD  
DESPITE PROBLEMS

¶2. (SBU) Per ref A, ANCOP units undergo a 16-week training program, which is double the training provided to other elements of the ANP. Upon completion of the first 10 weeks of training, the units are supposed to receive an additional six weeks of specialization training conducted by the MOI in close coordination with CSTC-A. Additionally, all ANCOP units receive 60 days of post-basic collective training at their deployment units location. Currently, approximately 300 graduates from the First and Second Urban Battalions are receiving the post-basic training at the Central Training Center (CTC) at Kabul. Additionally, approximately 110 ANCOP patrolmen deployed to Kandahar are receiving 60 day post-basic training at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Maholic and the ANCOP Headquarters in Kandahar city.

¶3. (SBU) Both CSTC-A and DynCorp police trainers observed strong unit cohesion among the First and Second Battalion units currently training in Kabul. The trainers said the units are attending classes on the role of police in Afghan society and human rights. During this phase of training, the police trainers are instructed to observe the students and select the best students for advanced SWAT tactical training.

¶4. (S) There are several coordination problem between the MOI and Ministry of Defense (MOD). One example is the use of range facilities for firearms instruction of ANCOP personnel.

A police trainer reported an incident in June over the use of MOD range facilities for ANCOP firearms instruction. An Afghan National Army (ANA) sergeant reportedly refused to allow ANCOP units to use the range facilities (which the MOI claims it had reserved with the MOD). When pressed by the ANCOP unit for access, the ANA drew their weapons on the ANCOP personnel and forced them to leave. As a result, the ANCOP units in Kabul are being given abbreviated firearms training. According to CTC personnel, the range issue has been ongoing and is not exclusive to ANCOP. CSTC-A is aware of this problem and is working between the MOI and MOD to resolve it. However, this is another example of inadequate MOI coordination and leadership on managing important aspects of this program. As a temporary solution, CSTC-A, is providing additional firearms practice to ANCOP recruits during their initial training.

15. (S) Specialization training scheduled for July for the 183 members of the First Battalion, Second Brigade rural ANCOP unit in Kandahar has been undermined by the fact that approximately 64 of the ANCOP unit's personnel are absent without leave (AWOL), while an additional 13 have been granted leave. (Note: The reason behind the high AWOL rate was reportedly was lack of salary payment to the ANCOP personnel. CSTC-A reports that this issue has been resolved but cannot account for returning AWOL personnel. If they return, the AWOL personnel will be placed on a rotational training cycle and integrated into future training programs to ensure that they receive required training. End Note) The remaining personnel will be placed on a rotational training cycle with 31 conducting smaller group training at a forward operating base (FOB) near Kandahar while the remaining patrolmen conduct security for the ANCOP Kandahar site. This

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rotation cycle is to continue until all have completed the required specialization training. The ANCOP personnel on leave will be reintegrated with the new graduating class from Herat, once they arrive at Kandahar in August for specialization training. However, Task Force Canada personnel in Kandahar have commented the remaining ANCOP patrolmen in training are performing well in training and security functions.

16. (S) According to CSTC-A, discussions are ongoing for the Kandahar ANCOP Battalion to be partnered with U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) for advanced tactical training. The ANCOP battalion in Kandahar currently has a Police Mentor Team (PMT) from Task Force Phoenix (with embedded civilian police, CIVPOL) assigned to it. If the request is approved, the TF Phoenix PMT will have oversight over the SOF-conducted training. (Note: Post has raised concerns about this development, and CSTC-A leadership has assured us that this training will not go forward without civilian police oversight and notification of the Embassy of the plans ensuring same. Post understands that the counter-insurgency environment in Southern Afghanistan requires advanced tactical training for these units to survive contact with anti-government forces (AGF). However, civilian police trainer oversight is critical to ensuring that the rural ANCOP units perform police, rather than para-military functions. End Note)

18. (SBU) There are currently 322 ANCOP recruits at RTC Mazar completing the initial 16 week course. Additionally, training will commence in late July at RTC Herat for the Second Battalion, Second Brigade, ANCOP unit selected for deployment to Kandahar. CSTC-A reports that the Italian Carabinieri have agreed to assist with patrol training in Herat. (Note: Italy's decision to allow the Carabinieri to assist with ANCOP is a positive development for the program because of their specialized police skills. End Note.)

MOI LEADERSHIP LACKING ON COMMAND AND CONTROL

19. (C) Post has serious concerns about the MOI's ability to

exercise command and control over the ANCOP program. ANCOP currently suffers from a severe shortage of officers to command the battalions undergoing specialization training. Per ref A, ANCOP officers are supposed to attend a five week leadership course with other ANP officers prior to joining their units at week nine of the basic training. (Note: The concept behind this idea was for the officers to develop unit cohesion as they trained with the men they would later command. End Note.) However, there are currently no ANCOP officers training with the ANCOP units either in specialized trained in Kabul and Kandahar or with the current ANCOP classes going through the RTCs in Herat and Mazar-E-Sharif. CSTC-A reports that Minister Zarar and Deputy Minister for Security Mangal are aware of this problem and have chosen 123 officers to fill leadership positions in the ANCOP program. These candidates are currently being vetted by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA).

¶10. (SBU) DynCorp police trainers also informed post about a recent incident involving ANCOP units in Kabul that were ordered by the MOI to conduct patrols around the city without coordination with Kabul City Police or the proper mobilization orders from MOI Deputy Minister of Security Mangal. (Note: ANCOP is not supposed to be mobilized without operational orders from the Deputy Minister of Interior. End Note) Although CSTC-A was unable to ascertain who in the MOI issued the orders for the ANCOP unit to conduct patrols, they briefed post that this would not happen again. Additionally, CSTC-A mentors held a meeting between Kabul Chief of Police Major General Esmatullah and ANCOP Chief Brigadier General Sharif June 26 and confirmed that General Sharif would immediately inform General Esmatullah of any ANCOP patrols or operations within Kabul.

#### DELAYED PAYMENT HINDERING ANCOP RETENTION IN KANDAHAR

¶11. (SBU) Per ref A, ANCOP personnel are promoted more rapidly compared to the ANP. Upon completion of the initial training, each patrolman is promoted to 3rd Sergeant and is

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supposed to receive a salary of \$115 per month. Another promotion is supposed occur after the completion of specialization training, at which time the individual is supposed to become a 2nd Sergeant and earn \$140 per month.

¶12. (SBU) CSTC-A Regional Police Advisor Trainer (RPAT) reported at a July 9 conference that members of the First Battalion, Second Brigade, in Kandahar had not received pay for over two months. CSTC-A investigated this problem and discovered that MOI provincial finance officers had not submitted the necessary electronic forms to Kabul for payment. (Note: ANCOP is paid through electronic funds transfer. Each ANCOP patrolman is issued an account from which they can draw their pay at a commercial bank in the province to which they are deployed to. End Note.) Although the problem was resolved, the delay of payment contributed to the high ANCOP AWOL rate in Kandahar. CSTC-A is sending trained MOI finance officers to the RTCs in Mazar and Herat to ensure each new ANCOP patrolmen are properly registered to receive their pay. (Comment: It is essential that ANCOP patrolmen are paid on time. Should such pay problems continue, ANCOP patrolmen will become demoralized and this elite unit could become a subversive threat to Afghan security. End Comment)

#### FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES BEING RESOLVED

¶13. (SBU) CSTC-A is currently overseeing the construction of several ANCOP facilities throughout Afghanistan. The ANCOP barracks in Kabul is undergoing badly needed renovation and upgrade to include improved living conditions for the patrolmen. Additionally, CSTC-A has begun construction on the Adraskan ANCOP Training Facility in Herat province that will have an expected capacity for billeting 700 trainees by the end of October. CSTC-A is also working with MOI to secure

land for an additional ANCOP basing facility near Jalalabad.  
(Note: CSTC-A has \$500 million allocated for ANCOP facilities and equipment. End Note.)

¶14. (SBU) CSTC-A has ordered specialized SWAT weapons and equipment including non-lethal crowd control equipment and advanced communications gear. CSTC-A is also working on securing Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) and will begin training on these systems once they arrive in country, date to be determined.

COMMENT

¶15. (C) ANCOP is intended to be the most specialized and elite police unit within the MOI. The sustainment of this force will not only require a substantial and extended resource commitment, but equally importantly, strong leadership from the MOI. The senior MOI leadership must demonstrate effective leadership, better command and control, and resolve over pay and personnel issues if this elite unit is to be sustained. A failure to provide adequate leadership and support could turn this highly equipped force into a security liability.

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